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We found that the way people looked at images was influenced by their belief that others
were looking too. If participants believed that an unseen other person was also looking at
what they could see, it shifted the balance of their gaze between negative and positive
images. The direction of this shift depended upon whether participants thought that later
they would be compared against the other person or would be collaborating with them.
Changes in the social context influenced both gaze and memory processes, and were
not due just to participants’ belief that they are looking at the same images, but also to
the belief that they are doing the same task. We believe that the phenomenon of joint
perception reveals the pervasive and subtle effect of social context upon cognitive and
perceptual processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Social context, the real or imagined presence of other people
(Allport, 1954), is a ubiquitous psychological force. Cognition is
enveloped by social context (Smith and Semin, 2004; Smith and
Conrey, 2009). Yet the effects of social context upon cognition
often fall between the cracks of social and cognitive psychology. In
cognitive and perceptual laboratories, we typically place partici-
pants in an experimental quarantine, away from the confounds of
social influence. As a consequence, we have many elegant demon-
strations of the different behavioral and neurological responses
to social versus non-social stimuli (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 2005;
Birmingham et al., 2008; Senju and Johnson, 2009), but little idea
of how these and other stimuli are processed in a social versus
a non-social context. Increasingly, as this special edition shows,
researchers are advocating that neuroscience and cognitive psy-
chology directly address issues of social context and interaction
(Schilbach, 2010; Obhi and Sebanz, 2011; Shibata et al., 2011).
In this paper, we asked what is the difference between perceiv-
ing something by your self and perceiving it at the same time as
another person? When a student hovers over your shoulder while
you read their paper, does it influence your evaluation? When
someone sits down on the sofa while you are watching TV, does
their presence intrude upon your experience of the show? What if
you are watching a show alone, but know that a friend across town
is also tuned in? We term this phenomenon joint perception: the
changes that happen when people believe that they are experienc-
ing something at the same time as another person. To isolate these
effects from the demands of social interaction, we minimized the
social content of joint perception. Participants could not see, hear
or interact with each other. We presented images to participants,
tracked their gaze, and manipulated—on a trial by trial basis—
whether or not they believed that an unseen other person was
looking at the same sets of images.
It is hard to discern, from the literature, whether such a min-
imal social context will have any influence visual attention, as
the presence of a social context is often intertwined with social
interaction. For example, language use requires a high level of
social interaction. When two people talk, their eye movements
can be highly sensitive to what they think each other knows and
sees (Horton and Keysar, 1996; Bromme et al., 2001; Nadig and
Sedivy, 2002; Hanna et al., 2003; Metzing and Brennan, 2003;
Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2009). In contrast,
other researchers have argued that people can be striking egocen-
tric (Keysar et al., 2000; Keysar, 2007) in the way they deploy their
gaze during language processing.
At a lower level of social context, there are experiments in
which two people do not speak to each other but are engaged
in the same task. For example, in a traditional stimulus-response
compatibility task, participants make a judgment about one
stimulus property (color) and ignore another stimulus property
(location). If there is an incompatibility between the irrelevant
property and the response (e.g., the stimulus is on an opposite
side of the screen to the response button) then reaction times
increase (Simon, 1969). Sebanz et al. (2003) divided such a task
between two people. The participants sat next to each other,
and each person responded to one color: in effect, each acting
as one of the fingers of a participant in Simon’s (1969) exper-
iment. Though each person had only one response to execute,
they showed an incompatibility effect when acting together. There
was no incompatibility effect when performing the same single
response task alone.When engaged in a task together, participants
represent their partners’ actions as if they were their own.
People will also attune to stimuli that an experimenter iden-
tifies as shared: if they are told that someone else is looking at
a stimulus, that increases its salience (Shteynberg, 2010). More
subtly, people configure their attentional state to that of others.
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Their ability to attend to global or local features in a Navon figure
(Navon, 1977) is influenced by the knowledge that a co-actor is
attending to local or global features (Böckler et al., 2012). Infants
follow the gaze of others (Senju and Johnson, 2009), and if their
attention is drawn to an event by another’s gaze (compared to a
non-social cue such as a arrow) they learn more about that event
(Wu and Kirkham, 2010; Wu et al., 2011).
In short, people are highly responsive to where others are look-
ing, if they are given that information. In the these experiments,
we address a more rudimentary issue: if people simply know that
others are looking, but not where, how do they change their gaze
patterns?
At this lowest level of social context, the eye movement lit-
erature is largely agnostic. From early eye movement research it
has been shown that differences in expertise (Buswell, 1935) and
cognitive process (Yarbus, 1967; Just and Carpenter, 1976) exert
a top-down effect on gaze. But social context itself has not been a
variable of concern in eye movement research (e.g., Henderson,
2003), in the way that it has been studied elsewhere (Zajonc,
1965).
The studies we present contrast with those which explicitly
give participants a task to perform with another (Sebanz et al.,
2003), which explicitly tell participants what another person is
attending to (Brennan et al., 2008; Shteynberg, 2010; Böckler
et al., 2012) and experiments in which participants communicate
with each other (Richardson et al., 2007, 2009; Dale et al., 2011).
We presented participants with a set of normed images, know-
ing that that they would be biased to attend to some over others.
Instruction, interaction and cooperation with another person
were absent, and we focused on changes in perception that were
brought about just by the knowledge that the images were expe-
rienced with another person or not. By focusing on this minimal
social context, we can explore the shifts in perceptual processes
that occur in response to the presence of others, prior to commu-
nication, joint action or cooperation taking place.
EXPERIMENT 1
Pairs of participants who did not know each other, or interact
during the experiment, sat in opposite corners of the lab. We pre-
sented them with sets of four images, on screen for eight seconds.
On different trials, they each believed that the other participant
was looking at the same images, or that the other was looking at a
set of unrelated symbols (Figure 1). The four pictures were taken
from a normed database (Lang et al., 2005). In each set, there
was one picture with a negative valence (e.g., crying child), one
with a positive valence (e.g., a smiling couple) and two neutral
images with no strong valence (e.g., a person reading). Negative
images are considered more potent than equivalently-valenced
FIGURE 1 | Trial schematic.
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positive images (for reviews, see Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin
and Royzman, 2001). We anticipated, therefore, that the negative
stimuli were more likely to receive participants’ attention in line
with previous work (Smith et al., 2003; Norris et al., 2004; Hajcak
and Olvet, 2008). We tested the hypothesis that this attentional
bias would be influenced by the minimal social context of the
participants’ belief that they were looking at the pictures jointly
or alone.
METHODS
Participants
There were 20 undergraduates from University College London
who took part in the experiment in exchange for course credit.
The participants were randomly paired and did not interact. We
did not collect data from two due to equipment problems and
failures to calibrate. Although we ran pairs of participants in
the lab, each participant’s data were analysed independently as
they could not see each other or interact. At debriefing, partic-
ipants did not give any indication that they realized we would
be comparing their gaze patterns during the joint and alone
conditions.
Apparatus
Participants were positioned in opposite corners of a 5 m2 room.
They could not see each other or each others’ displays. Each par-
ticipant sat in a reclining chair looking up at an armmounted 19′′
LCD screen approximately 60 cm away. A custom built remote eye
tracker was mounted at the base of each display. The participants
wore headsets, through which they could hear the stimuli and
speak to the experimenter. Two iMacs calculated gaze position
for each participant approximately 100 times a second, pre-
sented stimuli and recorded fixation position parsed into regions
of interest. The experimenter’s computer saved an audio-video
record of what the participants saw, heard and said during the
experiment, superimposed with their gaze positions.
Design and procedure
We presented participants with 64 trials in a random order.
Figure 1 provides a schematic. At the start of each trial a
prerecorded voice and text message informed participants about
the type of images they were about to see, and what their partner
would see. Half the time participants saw a set of four pictures,
and half the time they saw a set of four symbols. Counterbalanced
with the image type, participants were either (truthfully) told that
their partner would be looking at the same or a different image
type. In each picture trial, two were chosen randomly from a set
of neutral images, one from a set of positive, and one from a
set of negative images. The sets were created by selecting from
Lang et al.’s (2005) database of normed images according to their
valency ratings, to produce non-overlapping, equally spaced cate-
gories: neutral (valence from 4.8 to 5.2,M = 5), positive (7.6–8.3,
M = 8), and negative (1.6–2.4,M = 2). The pictures were of real
world scenes as might be seen in a newspaper. The symbol sets,
which served only as filler items in this design, were taken at ran-
dom from a set of geometric patterns found in various font sets.
The images were displayed onscreen for 8 s. Following a blank
screen for 1 s, the next trial began.
Results and discussion
We calculated the total looking times to positive and negative
images across each trial, as shown in Figure 2. These times were
different when participants were looking alone versus jointly. A 2
(picture valence: negative or positive) × 2 (social context: joint
or alone) ANOVA showed a significant interaction [F(1, 17) =
9.96, p = 0.006, η2 = 0.37], and a significant difference between
valence conditions only in the joint condition (Tukey’s HSD,
p < 0.01). When they believed that their partner was looking
at the same stimuli, participants looked more at the negative
images. There was no significant difference when they believed
they were looking alone. There was a main effect of picture
valence [F(1, 17) = 5.24, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.24] but not of social
context alone (F < 1).
Participants in this experiment could not see or interact with
each other, and had no knowledge of each others’ gaze or atten-
tional focus. They were not instructed to perform a task with
each other or coordinate their activity in any way. They simply
viewed pictures by themselves, with or without the experimenter’s
assurance that an unseen partner could see the same thing. Yet
surprisingly their eye movements were systematically shifted by
this minimal social context on a trial-by-trial basis. It was not
FIGURE 2 | Results form Experiment 1.
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simply that shared images received greater attention, as found by
Shteynberg (2010). Indeed, in our experiment there was no main
effect on looking times overall. More specifically than has been
shown before, we found that when set images were believed to be
shared there was a shift in participants’ distribution of attention.
EXPERIMENT 2
We have demonstrated that eye movements are influenced by
beliefs about social context. One could argue, however, that
eye movements are indicative of lower level perceptual process-
ing alone, and that in cognitive terms they are epiphenomenal.
Although there are theoretical and empirical arguments against
this view (Spivey et al., 2009), we wanted to investigate whether
minimal social context differences were also reflected in ameasure
of cognitive performance: recognition memory. In this version of
the paradigm, eye movement measures were not taken but, fol-
lowing presentation blocks, participants’ memory for the images
was tested. We hypothesized that minimal social context which
affected attention in Experiment 1 would be sufficient to affect
memory here.
METHODS
The experiment was identical to Experiment 1 apart from the
following details.
Participants
There were 36 undergraduates from University College London
who took part in the experiment in exchange for course credit. We
did not use data from eight because, at debriefing, the participants
indicated some awareness of our hypotheses.
Design and procedure
All participants were run simultaneously in separate cubicles of a
computer lab. At the start of the experiment, an instruction screen
told them that they would be collaborating with a partner on a
memory task, and that the computer had randomly paired them
with another participant in the group. They saw a fake text mes-
sage from the other participant greeting them, and were invited
to respond with a short message. In fact, the participants were
not paired with anyone and had no interaction with each other.
There were two identical blocks. In the presentation phase
of each, participants saw eight trials that were identical to those
shown in Experiment 1: half were picture presentations, and half
were symbols. On half the trials participants were told that they
were looking the same images as their partners, and on the other
half that they were looking at different images. Following that,
there were 32 test trials, which consisted of a single picture pre-
sented until the participants made a yes or no response to indicate
whether they had seen it before. On half the occasions, the picture
had been previously presented and was either one of the negative
or one of the positive images.
Results
Accuracy recognizing pictures that had been seen before was 85%,
and did not differ between experimental conditions. Following
standard work in visual memory (Sternberg, 1969) and, more
specifically, work on the social tuning of memory (Shteynberg,
2010), we used reaction times as a more sensitive measure of
memory performance. A 2 (valence)× 2 (social context) ANOVA
found a significant interaction [F(1, 27) = 6.98, p = 0.014, η2 =
0.21]. In the joint looking condition, the negative images (M =
758ms, SD= 114) were recognized faster than the positive (M =
794ms, SD = 120). Conversely, in the alone condition, positive
images (M = 785ms, SD = 113) were recognized faster than the
negative (M = 828ms, SD = 155). There was a main effect of
social context [F(1, 27) = 8.01, p = 0.009,η2 = 0.23], but not of
valence (F < 1).
Discussion
Looking at something together affects more than eye movements.
The images that received more visual attention in previous exper-
iments, according to their valence and the social context, were
also remembered more efficiently in this study. This result echoes
Shteynberg’s (2010) finding that when participants believe other
people are examining the same stimuli as they are, those images
become more “psychologically prominent.” But in contrast, here
and in Experiment 1, participants were not told which of the
images the other person was looking at. They simply knew that
another person was looking, and this minimal social context
influenced which particular images attracted more attention and
proved easier to recall. In the following experiment, we investi-
gated exactly what it was about the “minimal social context” that
brought about this attentional shift. In other words, what counts
as “looking together”?
EXPERIMENT 3
There are at least two ways to interpret “looking together,” which
up until now we have treated as a single idea. On the one hand,
looking together could mean just experiencing a set of images at
the same time. On the other hand, it could mean examining the
same images, but also having the same goal, attitude or intention
towards them.
Our joint perception paradigm was based on work in joint
action (Sebanz et al., 2003; Galantucci and Sebanz, 2009). Joint
action effects do not occur if the participant is simply sat next to
another person (Tsai et al., 2006), or if that person’s button press-
ing actions are not intentional (their finger is moved by amechan-
ical device). Also, if the participant is acting jointly, but with a
computer program (Tsai et al., 2008) or a marionette’s wooden
hand (Tsai and Brass, 2007) there is no stimulus-response incom-
patibility effect. Participants only form representations of another
when that person’s genuine, intentional actions are engaged in the
same task (Atmaca et al., 2011).
In the current experiment, we began to investigate whether the
same sort of conditions circumscribing joint action also deter-
mine joint perception. Unlike those described above, in this
experiment the participants always believed that they were exam-
ining the same images. What changed, trial-by-trial, was the task
that they were doing, and the task that they believed their part-
ner was doing. Sometimes they or their partner were memorizing
the pictures, sometimes they were scanning them for the pres-
ence of a small X.We predicted that joint perception effects would
be strongest when participants believed that they were not just
passively sharing an experience, but also engaged in the same task.
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METHODS
The experiment was identical to Experiment 1, apart from the
details below.
Participants
There were 32 University College London students who partici-
pated for course credit. Data from four participants were unusable
due to equipment calibration problems.
Design
The instruction screen defined two tasks for the participants. In
a memory task, they had to remember the pictures for a later test
(which never actually took place). In the search task, they had to
look for a translucent X superimposed on one image, and press
the mouse button that they held in one hand if they detected
it. They were informed that both their own task and their part-
ner’s task could change from trial to trial, but both of them would
always see the same pictures.
At the start of each trial, participants were told their
task for the upcoming presentation. A large icon at the top
of the screen represented the task (visual search or mem-
ory), and a smaller icon below showed their partner’s task
(shown in Figure 3). They also heard a voice say “You will
be [memorizing/searching]. Your partner will be [memorizing/
searching]”.
There were 40 trials. In half the participant was told to mem-
orize the stimuli and in half to search for an X. Participants’ own
task was crossed with the task they were told their partner was
doing. Half the time they were told that their partner performed
the same task, and half a different task. On eight trials (spread
evenly across conditions), an X appeared at a random location on
one of the images.
Results and discussion
Participants showed a robust preference for negative images over
positive images onlywhen they believed that they and their partner
had been assigned the same task. We calculated the total amount
of time spent looking at the critical negative and positive images
on trials where there was no X (we did not analyse the 20% of
trialswhen therewas anXpresent, asX andparticipants’ responses
to it would interfere with how they allocated their attention to
each image). A 2 (valence) × 2 (own task: memory/search) ×
2 (other’s task: same/different) ANOVA was performed, and the
means for each cell are displayed in Figure 3. There was a sig-
nificant two way interaction between valence and other’s task
[F(1, 27) = 10.08, p = 0.004, η2 = 0.41]. Post hoc tests show that
the difference between positive and negative images was signif-
icant when the participants believed they were doing the same
task (Tukey’s HSD p = 0.01), but did not reach significance when
they were doing a different task. There was also a main effect of
valence [F(1, 27) = 19.19, p = 0.0001, η2 = 0.27], but all other
main effects and interactions were non significant (all Fs < 1).
The effect of joint perception does not occur simply when par-
ticipants believe that another person is experiencing the same
stimuli. It is necessary for them to believe that the other, unseen
person is engaged in the same task as themselves. This task could
be to memorize the pictures, which presumably would require
processing the meaning of an image, or the task could just be to
search for a visual feature, which requires only superficial pro-
cessing. Regardless, the effect of joint perception arises whenever
these tasks are believed to be done together.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Social context exerts a pervasive effect on perception. Even amini-
mal social context, when the difference between looking alone and
FIGURE 3 | Results from Experiment 3. Looking times showed a significant interaction between valance and whether or not the participant’s partner was
belived to be doing the same or a different task.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 194 | 5
Richardson et al. Joint perception
looking jointly is as small as possible, produces distinct behav-
ioral and cognitive effects. Shared exposure is not sufficient to
produce these effects alone: participants must also believe that
they are engaged in the same task when processing the shared
stimuli.
This result is distinct from other findings in area between
social and cognitive psychology. There are many interesting
studies of joint action (e.g., Obhi and Sebanz, 2011), but our
experiments are different because participants are not instructed
to coordinate their behavior or act together. There are many
interesting studies on joint attention and how people use infor-
mation about each other’s attentional state (Brennan et al., 2008;
Shteynberg, 2010; Böckler et al., 2012), but our experiments are
different because participants are given no knowledge of where
the other is looking. And finally, there are many studies of atten-
tional coordination during social interaction and language use
(e.g., Richardson et al., 2007), but in our experiments there is
no interaction between people at all. Nevertheless, despite the
very minimal nature of this minimal social context, it produces
a systematic shift in participants’ attention.
In these first experiments, we have tried to understand the con-
ditions under which joint perception influences attention. But we
have not yet addressed the direction of these effects. Why is it
that sharing images in our paradigm led to increased attention
specifically to the negative pictures? Here we discuss four alterna-
tives: social context modulates the strength of the negativity bias
specifically, or it modulates attention and alertness more broadly;
social context increases the degree to which there is alignment
with emotions, or alignment with saliency.
It has been argued that the negativity bias exists because of
a learnt or evolved priority to detect threats in the environment
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin and Royzman, 2001). If social con-
text was associated with an increase in perceived threat or anxiety,
then it would follow that joint perception could increase the neg-
ativity bias specifically. This is possible, but it seems unlikely that
our participants would have felt increased threat from each other.
All participants were first year undergraduate students at UCL,
and so were members of similar or overlapping social groups.
Even if they did feel some anxiety in each others’ presence, it is
not clear why that threat would change trial-by-trial according to
the stimuli they believed each other could see. However, to fully
discount this possibility, we would need to experimentally manip-
ulate the anxiety felt by participants, perhaps by changing their
in/out group relationship.
The second possibility is that the social context of joint per-
ception increases some broad cognitive factor such as alertness,
in the way that the presence of others can cause social facilitation
(Zajonc, 1965). It has been shown, for example, that when par-
ticipants are engaged in a dialogue, it can increase alertness and
counter the effects of sleep deprivation (Bard et al., 1996). Perhaps
the lower level of social context used in this experiment, and
modulated trial-by-trial, also increased alertness. This increased
engagement would presumably benefit the negative images first
of all, since there is a pre-existing bias towards them. However,
under this account, it remains a puzzle why there would be no cor-
responding increase in looks to positive items at all. One would
expect a main effect of social context on look times to these
two items (compared to the neutral items), but throughout our
experiments we found an interaction between social context and
valance.
A third possibility draws on work in social psychology show-
ing that social interaction leads to emotional alignment. When
people interact, they are motivated to form a “shared reality”
(Hardin and Higgins, 1996): a speaker will adapt the content of
their message to align with the beliefs and emotions of their audi-
ence (reviewed by Echterhoff et al., 2009). Similarly, when people
collaborate in groups, they tend to align with the group emotion
(Hatfield et al., 1993; Wageman, 1995; Barsade, 2002). Since indi-
viduals are attuned to negative stimuli, it is conceivable that in a
group, this shared negativity bias would be amplified as people
seek to align with each other. Over repeated experiences, perhaps
this social alignment towards negative stimuli becomes ingrained.
In this light, our joint perception phenomenon could be seen as a
form of minimal, imagined cooperation that is sufficient to evoke
a learnt alignment towards negative images.
The final alternative is that the joint perception effect is not
driven by emotion, per se, but by salience. This account draws on
observations of language use and the rich joint activity of social
interaction. Language is remarkably ambiguous. “Please take a
chair,” could refer to a variety of actions with a variety of chairs
in a room. Conversations do not grind to a halt however, because
people are very good at resolving ambiguous references by draw-
ing on knowledge about the context and assumptions that they
have in common (Schelling, 1960). For example, when presented
with a page full of items, such as watches from a catalogue, par-
ticipants agreed with each other which one was most likely to be
referred to as “the watch” (Clark et al., 1983).
When we enter into any conversation, such coordination is
all important (Clark, 1996), and can be seen at many levels of
behavior. When we talk, we use the same names for novel objects
(Clark and Brennan, 1991), align our spatial reference frames
(Schober, 1993), use each others’ syntactic structures (Branigan
et al., 2000), sway our bodies in synchrony (Condon and Ogston,
1971; Shockley et al., 2003) and even scratch our noses together
(Chartrand and Bargh, 1999). When we are talking and look-
ing at the same images, we also coordinate our gaze patterns
with each other (Richardson and Dale, 2005), taking into account
the knowledge (Richardson et al., 2007) and the visual context
(Richardson et al., 2009) that we share. In short, language engen-
ders a rich, multileveled coordination between speakers (Shockley
et al., 2009; Louwerse et al., in press).
Perhaps the instruction stating that images were being viewed
together was enough to turn on some of these mechanisms of
coordination, even in the absence of any actual communication
between participants. When images were believed to be shared,
participants sought out those which they imagined would be
more salient for their partners. Since saliency is driven by the
valence of the images in our set, payingmore attention to themost
salient means paying more attention to the negative image. In this
way, it can be argued that the shifts brought about by joint per-
ception are the precursors to the more richly interactive forms of
joint activity studied in other fields.
Our experiments echo a point that social psychologists have
made from the outset. The presence and actions of others can
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have a powerful effect on an individual’s motivations, goals and
judgments (Triplett, 1898; Sherif, 1935; Lewin, 1936; Festinger,
1950; Asch, 1951; Allport, 1954; Heider, 1958; Zajonc et al., 1969).
Beliefs and judgments are not formed in cognitive isolation, but
always in the context of the thoughts and opinions of those
around us (Smith and Semin, 2004). Here we have shown that
these lessons from social psychology can be applied to a simple
perceptual process in a minimal social context. Merely the belief
that stimuli are attended to alone or with another is enough to
activate coordinative behaviours that are the basis of joint action,
communication and social interaction. The pervasive effects of
social context have theoretical implications for how we view cog-
nition (Robbins and Aydede, 2009), adding to calls to consider
social interaction at its heart (Smith and Semin, 2004; Barsalou
et al., 2007).
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